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Threats from international terrorism are increasing1 with concern
over radicalisation and recruitment of young Muslim men.
Migrants from countries without effective governance may not
easily assimilate and may become radicalised, with extremist
views. However, extremist views may also involve nationalism.
In both contexts, war may be perceived as a ‘just cause’. There
has been little research into factors maintaining loyalty and
willingness to fight for a country, and pathways to terrorism
remain complex and unclear. However, potential recruits for
terrorist groups are more likely to feel angry, alienated or
disenfranchised, believe political involvement cannot effect
change, identify with perceived victims of social injustice and feel
need to take action. They believe violence against the state is
justified, have friends or family sympathetic to the cause, and
benefit psychologically from sense of adventure, camaraderie
and heightened identity.2 Poor mental health could be associated
with some of these characteristics, increasing risk of engaging in
terrorism or becoming radicalised. A common characteristic,
however, is that terrorists, unless lone actors,3 have little evidence
of psychopathology.4–7 Severe mental disorders are therefore not
commonly associated with terrorism, but mental disorder may
confer vulnerability to radicalising influences.8 Extremism could
be a reaction to adversity, leading to empowerment, overcoming
or averting symptoms such as depression. By 2010, UK media
reported growing numbers of British-born Muslim men, mainly
of Pakistani descent, recruited by Al-Qaeda, trained in Pakistan
and fighting against the British army in Afghanistan. This
represented open armed conflict against British political and
cultural values. It is unclear whether these men were an isolated
minority or came from communities with shared attitudes
supporting terrorism. Support for terrorism within a population
is thought to resemble a pyramidal structure running from the
largest proportion at the bottom, consisting of neutral individuals,
andmoving up through levels of diminishing size, from sympathisers,
to supporters, with finally terrorists at the apex.4,9
No previous research has investigated the population
distribution of extremist attitudes and support for armed conflict
and corresponding associations with mental disorder. We
therefore carried out a representative survey of the attitudes of
men aged 18–34 years in England, Scotland and Wales towards
the war in Afghanistan. Our aims were to investigate: (a) the
population distribution of pro-British and anti-British views
associated with the war; (b) linear associations between ethnicity/
religion, violence/criminality and psychiatric morbidity; and (c)
explanatory factors for observed associations.
Method
Data collection
The survey was carried out in 2011 and has previously been
described.10 It was based on random location sampling, an
advanced form of quota sampling shown to reduce biases
introduced when interviewers are able to choose locations to
sample from. Individual sampling units (census areas of 150
households each) were randomly selected within British regions
in proportion to their population. The basic survey included a
representative sample of young men (18–34 years) from England,
Scotland and Wales. In addition, there were two boost surveys.
First, young Black and minority ethnic (BME) men were selected
from output areas with a minimum of 5% BME inhabitants.
Second, young men from lower social grades (as defined by the
market research society and based on head of household: semi-
skilled, unskilled, occasional manual workers; and pensioners
and welfare recipients) were selected from output areas in which
there was a minimum of 30 men 18–34 years of age in these social
grades. A self-administered questionnaire piloted in a previous
survey was adapted for this study. Informed consent was obtained
from all survey respondents, who then completed pencil and paper
questionnaires in privacy. They were paid £5 for participation.
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Background
There is growing risk from terrorism following radicalisation of
young men. It is unclear whether psychopathology is associated.
Aims
To investigate the population distribution of extremist views
among UK men.
Method
Cross-sectional study of 3679 men, 18–34 years, in Great
Britain. Multivariate analyses of attitudes, psychiatric
morbidity, ethnicity and religion.
Results
Pro-British men were more likely to be White, UK born, not
religious; anti-British were Muslim, religious, of Pakistani
origin, from deprived areas. Pro- and anti-British views were
linearly associated with violence (adjusted odds ratio
(OR) = 1.51, 95% CI 1.38–1.64, P50.001, adjusted OR=1.33,
95% CI 1.13–1.58, P50.001, respectively) and negatively with
depression (adjusted OR=0.72, 95% CI 0.61–0.85, P50.001,
adjusted OR= 0.64, 95% CI 0.48–0.86, P=0.003, respectively).
Conclusions
Men at risk of depression may experience protection from
strong cultural or religious identity. Antisocial behaviour
increases with extremism. Religion is protective but may
determine targets of violence following radicalisation.
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Survey measures
The Psychosis Screening Questionnaire11 screened participants for
psychotic experiences; individuals were defined as screen-positive
if they met three or more criteria. Questions from the Structured
Clinical Interview for DSM-IV personality disorders screening
questionnaire12 identified antisocial personality disorder. Anxiety
disorder and depression were defined as a score of 511 on the
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale13 in the past week. Scores
520 on the Alcohol Use Disorders Identification Test14 and525
on the Drug Use Disorders Identification Test15 indicated alcohol
dependence and drug misuse disorder, respectively. Participants
were questioned about violent behaviour as in previous surveys
of violence.16 Information was sought about involvement in and
attitudes towards violence.
We could not ask participants if they actively supported
terrorism. We used proxy measures to investigate extremist
attitudes, support for Britain and the war in Afghanistan. We
asked which of the following applied: ‘I feel strongly British
(English, Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish) if that means standing
up for yourself or your country’; ‘I feel more like people with my
own religious, cultural or political beliefs than people who are
British’; ‘I support the war in Afghanistan’; ‘I oppose the war in
Afghanistan’; ‘I could fight in the British army in Afghanistan’;
‘I could fight against the British army in Afghanistan’. The variable
pairs were combined to reflect extremes in both directions. There
were few differences between those who responded negatively to
each pair of questions and those who endorsed ‘I don’t know’.
These two groups were therefore combined and constituted the
reference group against which the extremes were contrasted.
To study the distribution of degrees of extremism we created
two exposure variables: ‘pro-British’ and ‘anti-British’ by
combining the variables described above. Those who endorsed
negative answers or ‘don’t know’ to cultural identity, support of/
opposition to the war, and fighting for/against the British army
were coded ‘0’ and constituted the reference group for both
variables. Study participants who reported British/dual identity
or supported the war or own identity or opposed the war received
a rating of ‘1’. Those who reported British/dual identity and
supported the war or own identity and opposed the war received
a rating of ‘2’. A rating of ‘3’ was assigned when the person
reported support for, or opposition to, the war in Afghanistan.
The higher the rating on these two variables, the stronger were
the opinions towards the extreme. The survey participants were
also asked about current religious affiliation, how often they
attended religious services in the past month, and how often they
prayed.
Statistical analysis
For descriptive purposes, weighted absolute and relative
frequencies were reported for binary/polytomous variables and
weighted means and standard deviations for variables on
interval/ratio level. We ran weighted survey commands for logistic
regression models with binary outcomes. Analyses incorporated
adjustment of standard errors for clustering of individuals within
postcodes and important demographic characteristics (age and
index of multiple deprivation).
We first studied associations between the three exposure
variables cultural identity, support for/opposition to the war,
and fighting for/against the British army. We then investigated
whether increasing extremist views in both directions were related
to demography, ethnicity, religion, psychiatric morbidity and
violence and criminal behaviour. The two variables (pro-British
and anti-British) were treated as continuous exposure in the
logistic regression model.
In a final step we investigated psychiatric vulnerabilities and
protective effects in ethnic minority and religious groups and
associations with religiosity. If (a) a significant association
between ethnic/religious group and psychiatric morbidity was
found and (b) if the ethnic/religious group also demonstrated a
significant relationship with extremism, and (c) if extremism
was associated with psychiatric morbidity, we included the
extremism variables in the statistical model. If the association
between ethnic/religious group and psychiatric illness was no
longer significant following adjustment, extremism was
interpreted as an explanatory variable in this relationship.
All statistical analyses were carried out using Stata 14. A
significance level of 50.05 was adopted throughout.
Results
Demography and sampling
The weighted sample included 3679 men aged 18–34 years: 1983
(53.9%) from the main survey; 1075 (29.2%) from the minority
ethnic sample; and 621 (16.9%) from the sample of men from
lower social classes. Their mean age was 25.9 years (s.d. = 5.0),
more than half were single (2232, 61.5%) and more than a third
were unemployed (1382, 38.6%). The sample was ethnically
diverse, with 38.5% (1413) participants of BME origin.
Associations between cultural/national identity,
support for/opposition to the war, and fighting
for/against the British army
When contrasted to those endorsing ‘no’ or ‘I don’t know’, men
reporting British identity demonstrated higher rates of support
(adjusted OR=5.38, 95% CI 3.88–7.47, P50.001) and opposition
to the war (adjusted OR=2.37, 95% CI 1.80–3.10, P50.001). This
was also true of men identifying with their own culture, ethnicity
or cultural group (adjusted OR=1.91, 95% CI 1.05–3.49,
P= 0.034 for support; adjusted OR= 4.40, 95% CI 2.98–6.49,
P50.001 for opposition). The pattern was similar among those
identifying with both cultures (adjusted OR= 3.41, 95% CI
2.27–5.12, P50.001 and adjusted OR= 2.52, 95% CI 1.71–3.71,
P50.001, respectively).
Men with strong British identity and those identifying with
both cultures were more likely to report that they would fight
in the British army (adjusted OR=4.23, 95% CI 3.20–5.59,
P50.001 and adjusted OR= 4.07, 95% CI 2.60–6.38, P50.001,
respectively) but not against it. In contrast, men identifying
uniquely with their own culture were more likely to report they
would fight against the British army (adjusted OR= 5.08, 95%
CI 1.97–13.10, P50.001) but not in it. Among men with British
identity, support for the war was significantly associated with
willingness to fight in the British army (adjusted OR= 5.48;
95% CI 3.11–9.64, P50.001). Among men who identified with
their own culture, opposition to the war was associated with
willingness to fight against the British army (adjusted OR=4.74,
95% CI 1.07–88.38, P=0.043).
The epidemiology of extremism
The distribution of increasing degrees of extremism in opposing
directions (pro-British and anti-British) is shown in Fig. 1.
Approximately a third were neutral, answering all questions either
negatively or endorsed ‘don’t know’ (reference group for both
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extremes). The distribution towards the anti-British extreme
followed closely the shape of a pyramid. The shape differed
towards the pro-British extreme where more substantial numbers
of study participants endorsed willingness to fight in the British
army (pro-British extreme).
Associations between these opposing trends and demographic
characteristics are shown in online Table DS1 and those for
psychiatric morbidity, violence and crime are shown in Table 1.
Trends towards the pro-British extreme demonstrated significant
inverse relationship with higher educational qualifications, most
ethnic minority groups including Muslim, Hindu, Jewish/Sikh/
Buddhist/other, attendance at services, frequency of praying
(online Table DS1) and depressive illness (Table 1). There were
significant positive associations with drug misuse, antisocial
personality disorder and all variables measuring violence and
crime.
Trends towards anti-British extremism were positively associated
with socioeconomic deprivation, other White, Indian, Pakistani,
Bangladeshi, Black African, Chinese/other ethnicity, non-UK
born, other Christian, Muslim, Jewish/Sikh/Buddhist/other
religion, attendance at services and frequency of praying (online
Table DS1). Increasing anti-British attitudes demonstrated
positive relationships with antisocial personality disorder, violence
and imprisonment and an inverse association with depression
(Table 1).
Ethnicity, religion, and psychiatric morbidity
We then investigated associations between ethnicity, religion and
psychiatric morbidity (Table DS2). Ethnicity and religion/religiosity
were not associated with psychosis or anxiety disorder, apart from
an inverse association between Protestant religion and anxiety
disorder. The prevalence of depression was significantly higher
among Pakistani and Black minority groups than UK-born White
men. Alcohol dependence was less prevalent among Pakistani
men, all religious groups and among those endorsing measures
of religiosity compared with those affirming no religion/atheism.
Contrasted with White British men, there was less drug misuse
among Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Chinese/other minority
groups. Compared with men who were not religious, there was
less drug misuse among all religious groups and degrees of
religiosity, except Jewish/Sikh/Buddhist/other who showed no
difference. Antisocial personality disorder was also less prevalent
among Indian, Pakistani and Bangladeshi men, Protestant,
Muslim and Hindu men and among those endorsing religiosity.
Explanatory analyses
In a final step, we investigated whether associations found between
ethnic/religious groups and psychiatric morbidity were explained
by extremist views, both pro- and anti-British. Ethnic and
religious groups listed in Table 2 were selected on the basis of
associations with extremist views (Table 1 and online Table
DS1) and psychiatric morbidity (online Table DS2), which in turn
were associated with extremist views (Table 1 and online Table
DS1). Most associations between ethnicity and religious groups
remained significant after adjustment for extremism variables
and appeared to exert direct effects. Explanatory effects of
extremist views were found for depression among Pakistani
men; drug misuse among Indian and other Christian men;
antisocial personality disorder among Indian and Hindu young
men. This indicated that negative associations between these
minority/religious groups and psychiatric morbidities were not
direct but were explained by extremist views.
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Fig. 1 The distribution of extremism among young British men.
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Discussion
Population distribution of extremism
We are not aware of a previous population study that has
investigated the distribution of extremist attitudes and associations
with psychiatric morbidity. We showed that identification with
British national or other cultural identity did not determine
direction of support or opposition to the war but were associated
with holding strong opinions. Men could have a strong British
identity yet oppose the war, and vice versa. However, a combination
of strong British identity and support for the war were associated
with willingness to fight in the army; other cultural identity and
opposition to the war with willingness to fight against Britain.
We next investigated the distribution of these attitudes and
confirmed a pyramidal structure within this population,
corresponding to a postulated pyramidal model of distribution
of support for terrorism.4,9 A large number of men held neutral
views at the base of this structure, progressing through increasing
levels of opposition to the war and non-British identity, with
willingness to fight against the British army at the apex (Fig.1).
However, when we attempted to apply this structure to the larger
group of men who supported their country, the pyramidal
distribution (inverted) was not closely replicated. Despite
declining support for the war by 2011, 1 in 6 young adult British
men still reported they would fight in the army.
The stronger their pro-British attitudes, the more likely men
were White and UK-born, but less likely to report higher
educational qualifications or religious affiliation. They were more
likely to report violence in the past 5 years, excitement from
violence, criminal convictions and imprisonment. With increasing
anti-British attitudes, men were more likely to be non-UK born,
living in socioeconomically deprived geographical areas, from
BME subgroups and religious. Nevertheless, they were similar to
those with pro-British attitudes in being more likely to report
violence and imprisonment.
Externalising and antisocial behaviour are not uncommon
among applicants for military service in the USA and European
countries.17,18 Our findings correspond with recent trends in
recruitment to terrorist organisations, with decline in education
and socioeconomic status,6 and need for those prepared to
engage in open armed conflict rather than covert operations
requiring specialist skills and subterfuge. They also correspond
to successful targeting of prison populations for radicalisation
and recruitment.19
Extremism and depression
The key finding was that men at the bottom of this structure, with
neutral or undecided views, (Fig. 1) were more likely to be
depressed. Anti-British extremist views may have offered
protection against depression, specifically among men of Pakistani
origin. These findings correspond to the hypothesis that lack of
personal identity and meaning, with unfulfilled need for belonging,
create psychological vulnerability both to extremism8,20–22 and
anxiety and depression.23 Within this theoretical framework,
attributing blame, identifying responsible perpetrators,24 strong
national or other cultural identity, and active support for or
opposition to a cause, may protect against depression. For some
men, depression may be a precursor to ‘mobilisation’, leading to
active support for and consideration of involvement in terrorism
or armed conflict along a pathway of radicalisation.8 Lack of
identity and uncertainty, together with depression, may contribute
to a vulnerable state in which personal crisis can act as a trigger,
resulting in an opening for new beliefs and values,25–27 encouraged
by people holding similar values that legitimise violence.28
Relatives’ and friends’ experiences of social exclusion, including
poverty and reported experiences of racism, may have influenced
these individuals to take a more active position. Factors such as
turning to religion or new political beliefs triggered by a war
(against people with similar cultural and religious characteristics)
could result in a protective sense of empowerment involving new
meaning, belief systems and identity25 along a pathway ultimately
leading to violent action. However, since we cannot determine the
direction of association in this cross-sectional survey, respondents
with depression may simply have been less likely to fight for or
against their country or to hold extreme views because of their
depression.
The other key finding observed towards opposite extremes in
Fig. 1 was a linear association with antisocial personality disorder
and violence. Decisions to fight for or against a country may
involve a process of selection. Those with pre-existing antisocial
and pro-violent dispositions may simply be more likely to hold
extreme attitudes and be more suited for military action than
those whose attitudes are neutral or who are depressed.
Religion
As expected, religious affiliation and practice was protective
against externalising disorders such as alcohol dependence, drug
misuse and antisocial personality disorder, in line with religious
4
Table 1 Attitudes towards both extremes, psychiatric morbidity and violencea
Pro-British Anti-British
Adjusted OR (95% CI) P Adjusted OR (95% CI) P
Psychopathology
Psychosis 1.12 (0.90–1.39) 0.302 0.92 (0.51–1.67) 0.795
Anxiety 0.92 (0.81–1.05) 0.222 0.78 (0.60–1.02) 0.067
Depression 0.72 (0.61–0.85) 50.001 0.64 (0.48–0.86) 0.003
Alcohol dependence 1.08 (0.93–1.25) 0.324 0.77 (0.52–1.16) 0.217
Drug misuse 1.16 (1.04–1.29) 0.008 1.13 (0.86–1.48) 0.388
Antisocial personality disorder 1.52 (1.36–1.69) 50.001 1.54 (1.22–1.94) 50.001
Violence and crime
Any violence in past 5 years 1.51 (1.38–1.64) 50.001 1.33 (1.13–1.58) 50.001
Excited by violence 1.40 (1.20–1.63) 50.001 1.40 (0.93–2.11) 0.110
Criminal conviction (any) 1.46 (1.31–1.63) 50.001 1.02 (0.80–1.30) 0.885
In prison (ever) 1.55 (1.27–1.89) 50.001 1.81 (1.29–2.52) 50.001
a. See online Table DS1 for data relating to demographic characteristics, ethnicity and religion. Logistic regression adjusted for survey type, age and index of multiple deprivation.
95% confidence intervals were estimated using robust standard errors to account for correlations within survey areas because of clustering within postcodes.
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teachings.29,30 Increasing anti-British extremist views were linearly
associated with religion and religiosity, whereas increasing support
for British intervention in Afghanistan was negatively associated.
This polarisation of religious views may reflect ongoing processes
of mutual rejection and an exclusionary circle in the British
population, currently evident among many Muslim and non-
Muslim communities.31 Within these communities, particularly
those with multiple risk factors for radicalisation, extremism may
result from perception of an aggressive, oppressive non-Muslim
culture. A four-stage model of Al-Qaeda-influenced radicalisation
proposes a pre-radicalisation stage of vulnerability followed by
early exploration of Salafi Islam and gradual gravitation away
from old identity, association with like-minded individuals and
adoption of ideology.24 This is followed by progressive adoption
of jihadi-salafi ideology and finally jihadisation.6 Further
investigation is needed into whether depression is intensified
among Muslims by this mutual exclusionary process and whether
radicalisation, with new sense of belonging and identity,32 and
willingness to take violent action are associated with protection
and symptomatic improvement.
Experimental studies of support for suicide attacks have found
that attendance at religious services corresponds as a function of
collective religious activities, but differed from our findings in
that frequency of praying does not.33 We did not investigate
support for suicidal attacks. Furthermore, these studies found
inconsistencies across different countries and that these specific
associations with religious practice were strongest among
Palestinians and Israeli settlers. In the UK, needs for excitement
through violent action, camaraderie and strong masculine identity
may, for some men, be more important proximal factors than
religion, politics or cultural identity. Nevertheless, the latter may
legitimise and ultimately determine targets of violence.
Limitations
Our survey had several limitations, including our method of
defining identity where we combined ethnicity, cultural, religious
and political beliefs. Although we defined support for armed
conflict as ‘extremism’ for the purpose of our study, it could not
be ascertained whether men reporting willingness to fight against
the British Army actually intended to do so. Violent behaviour
within the past 5 years was self-reported, without objective
information such as data on arrest or convictions. Use of self-
report captures more violence than comes to the attention of
the authorities but may still have underestimated true prevalence.
Socially undesirable behaviours may be underreported because of
religious beliefs and cultural expectations.
Clinical presentations were derived from self-report question-
naires and not confirmed by clinical interview. However, clinician
assessments compare favourably with self-report instruments.
Given the cross-sectional nature of the data, we could not identify
whether these measures were associated with changes in cultural,
ethnic, religious and political views held by the respondent.
Nonetheless, the community-based design and large sample size
allowed examination of associations between different population
subgroups holding different beliefs and mental disorder
categories. Furthermore, sample size provided sufficient statistical
power to test complex models and control for confounding.
Random location sampling does not provide detailed
information on number of young men who declined to
participate. However, because the method is based on the national
census, participants were identified and included according to
representative strata and their actual frequency in the population.
Because young adult men of lower social class are more likely to
decline participation in household surveys, this method has
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considerable advantages when investigating antisocial behaviour.
The alternative would be to rely on a method requiring statistical
weighting to adjust for attrition, which may be particularly high
among this subgroup.
The finding that anti-British extremist views were negatively
associated with depression among Pakistani men but not Black
African men may be as a result of heterogeneity among countries
included in the latter combined category. The BME boost sample,
although large and representative, was underpowered to examine
men from specific African countries with large Muslim
populations and ongoing insurgencies. It was of interest that
men of Bangladeshi origin were no more likely to hold anti-British
extremist views or to have depression than White UK-born men.
However, it would be necessary to conduct further studies with
larger BME samples to investigate the roles of differing experiences
of racial discrimination, social mobility and ethnic density effects
across certain BME subgroups. It would also be necessary to
investigate the effects of right-wing and anti-immigrant views
on exacerbation of mutual rejection and an exclusionary circle.31
Implications
Since withdrawal of coalition forces from Afghanistan, concern
has grown over future support for terrorism within BME
communities, particularly in Europe. Young men who travel to fight
for Islamic State in Syria and Iraq, follow radical interpretations of
Islam, and oppose political and economic interests of their host
countries may return to threaten national security through
insurgency. Religious identity may have become an increasingly
important unifying and mobilising factor since 2011, when shared
language, geographical and cultural origin, and blood ties
additionally contributed to willingness to fight against the British
army in southern Afghanistan among young men of Pakistani
origin.34 Our findings indicated considerable heterogeneity across
the population among those expressing extremist views, with deep
divisions in personal attitudes and identity corresponding to
processes of mutual rejection and exclusion. Depressive symptoms
are more prevalent among minority populations in Europe.35
Separation with maintenance of ethnic culture but no
participation in local culture is associated with mood and anxiety
disorders.36 Further research is needed into interventions that
reduce discrimination, exclusion and extremism in these
communities and associated depression.
Extremism can spread to those with moderate views through
epidemic transmission when culture, religious and political values
shift quickly.37 Views and opinions initially considered extreme
may become the norm.38 Simulated models suggest that when a
large part of the population hold moderate views or are uncertain,
extreme views tend to prevail. This leads to either convergence on
a single extreme or to bipolarisation.39 Bipolarisation implies
strongly opposing views with neither achieving dominance.
Endorsement of willingness to fight for one’s country would
not be interpreted by most UK people as ‘extremism’ but
willingness, if necessary, to make an extreme sacrifice for the
benefit of, and to defend, the majority. Fusion theory would
suggest that the asymmetrical distribution in Fig. 1 was explained
by more UK men being strongly ‘fused’ through their personal
and social identity with UK values to make such sacrifices.40
However, this process is thought to depend on whether members
of a group share the same core characteristics and values.
Individuals in the group are more likely to fight and die for family
members, or those with whom they perceive close ties similar to
those in families within small social groups than for their country.
Promoting shared values and perceived similarity in personal
identity may therefore be important in preventing processes that
lead to bipolarisation. Our study may be a starting point for more
sophisticated investigation into whether these processes are failing
in European countries, whether bipolarisation has accelerated and
intensified within vulnerable communities with high levels of
depression, leading to convergence on a single extreme, and
increasing numbers of radicalised young men prepared to engage
in armed conflict.
Jeremy W. Coid, MBChB, MD(Lond), FRCPsych, MPhilDipCriminol, Violence
Prevention Research Unit, Wolfson Institute of Preventive Medicine, Queen Mary
University of London, London; Kamaldeep Bhui, MBBS, MSc, MD, FRCPsych, Centre
for Psychiatry, Wolfson Institute of Preventive Medicine, Queen Mary University of
London, London; Deirdre MacManus, MB ChB, MSc, MRCPsych, PhD, Institute of
Psychiatry, Psychology and Neurosciences, King’s College London, London;
Constantinos Kallis, PhD, Violence Prevention Research Unit, Wolfson Institute of
Preventive Medicine, Queen Mary University of London, London; Paul Bebbington,
PhD, FRCP, FRCPsych, Division of Psychiatry, Faculty of Brain Sciences, University
College London, London; Simone Ullrich, PhD, Violence Prevention Research
Unit, Wolfson Institute of Preventive Medicine, Queen Mary University of London,
London, UK
Correspondence: Simone Ullrich, Violence Prevention Research Unit, Queen
Mary University of London, Garrod Building, Turner Street, London E1 2AD, UK.
Email: s.ullrich@qmul.ac.uk
First received 18 Apr 2016, final revision 6 Jul 2016, accepted 8 Jul 2016
Funding
The survey was funded by the Maurice and Jacqueline Bennett Charitable Trust and the UK
National Institute for Health Research (NIHR). J.W.C., C.K. and S.U. were supported by a
Program Grant for Applied Research; program RP-PG-0407-10500. The views expressed
are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the UK National Health Service,
the NIHR or the UK Department of Health.
References
1 HM Government. 2010 to 2015 Government Policy: Counter-Terrorism. TSO,
2010 (www.gov.uk/government/publications/2010-to-2015-government-
policy-counter-terrorism/2010-to-2015-government-policy-counter-terrorism).
2 Horgan J. The Psychology of Terrorism. Routledge, 2005.
3 Corner E, Gill P. A false dichotomy? Mental illness and lone-actor terrorism.
Law Hum Behav 2015; 39: 23–34.
4 McCauley C, Moskalenko S. Mechanisms of political radicalization: pathways
toward terrorism. Terror Polit Violence 2008; 20: 415–33.
5 Denoeux G, Carter L. Guide to the Drivers of Violent Extremism. USAID, 2009.
6 Christmann K. Preventing Religious Radicalisation and Violent Extremism:
A Systematic Review of the Research Evidence. Youth Justice Board for
England and Wales, 2012.
7 Monahan J. The Individual Risk Assessment of Terrorism: Recent
Developments. Virginia Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 57.
University of Virginia School of Law, 2015 (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id = 2665815).
8 Borum R. Psychological vulnerabilities and propensities for involvement in
violent extremism. Behav Sci Law 2014; 32: 286–305.
9 Leuprecht C, Hataley T, Moskalenko S, McCauley C. Winning the battle but
losing the war? Narrative and counter-narratives strategy. Perspect Terror
2009; 3: 25–35.
10 Coid J, Ullrich S, Keers R, Bebbington P, Destavola BL, Kallis C, et al. Gang
membership, violence, and psychiatric morbidity. Am J Psychiatry 2013; 170:
985–93.
11 Bebbington P, Nayani T. The Psychosis Screening Questionnaire. Int J
Methods Psychiatry Res 1995; 5: 11–9.
12 Ullrich S, Deasy D, Smith J, Johnson B, Clarke M, Broughton N, et al.
Detecting personality disorders in the prison population of England and
Wales: comparing case identification using the SCID-II screen and the SCID-II
clinical interview. J Forensic Psychiatry Psychol 2008; 19: 301–22.
13 Zigmond A, Snaith R. The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale. Acta
Psychiatr Scand 1983; 67: 361–370.
14 Babor T, Higgings-Briddle J, Saunders J, Monteiro M. The Alcohol Use
Disorders Identification Test (2nd edn). World Health Organization, 2001.
15 Berman A, Bergman H, Palmstierna T, Schlyter F. Evaluation of the Drug Use
Disorders Identification Test (DUDIT) in criminal justice and detoxification
settings and in a Swedish population sample. Eur Addict Res 2005; 11:
22–31.
6
Extremism, religion and psychiatric morbidity
16 Coid J, Yang M, Roberts A, Ullrich S, Moran P, Bebbington P, et al. Violence
and psychiatric morbidity in a national household population – a report from
the British household survey. Am J Epidemiol 2006; 164: 1199–208.
17 MacManus D, Dean K, Jones M, Rona RJ, Greenberg N, Hull L, et al. Violent
offending by UK military personnel deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan: a data
linkage cohort study. Lancet 2013; 381: 907–917.
18 Rosellini AJ, Monahan J, Street AE, Heeringa SG, Hill ED, Petukhova M, et al.
Predicting non-familial major physical violent crime perpetration in the US
Army from administrative data. Psychol Med 2016; 46: 303–16.
19 Neumann R. Prisons and Terrorism: Radicalisation and De-Radicalisation in 15
Countries. International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Political
Violence, 2010.
20 Borum R. Psychology of Terrorism. University of South Florida, 2004 (http://
works.bepress.com/randy_borum/1).
21 Borum R. Radicalization into violent extremism I: a review of social science
theories. J Strat Secur 2011; 4: 7–36.
22 Borum R. Radicalization into violent extremism II: a review of conceptual
models and empirical research. J Strat Secur 2011; 4: 37–62.
23 Fisher LB, Overholser JC, Ridley J, Braden A, Rosoff C. From the outside
looking in: sense of belonging, depression, and suicide risk. Psychiatry 2015
78: 29–41.
24 Silber M, Bhatt A. Radicalization in the West: the Homegrown Threat. NYPD
Intelligence Division, 2007.
25 Lotz S, Baumert A, Schlo¨sser T, Gresser F, Fetchenhauer D. Individual
differences in third-party interventions: how justice sensitivity shapes
altruistic punishment. Negotiation Conf Manag Res 2011; 4: 297–313.
26 Bueno de Mesquita E, Dickson E. The propaganda of the deed: terrorism,
counterterrorism, and mobilization. Am J Polit Sci 2007; 51: 364–81.
27 Wilner A, Dubouloz C. Transformative radicalization: applying learning theory
to islamist radicalization. Stud Conf Terror 2011; 34: 418–38.
28 Ranstorp M. Understanding Violent Radicalisation. Routledge 2010.
29 Herrenkohl T, Tajima E, Whitney S, Huang B. Protection against antisocial
behavior in children exposed to physically abusive discipline. J Adolesc
Health 2005; 36: 457–65.
30 Kim-Spoon J, Longo G, McCullough M. Adolescents who are less religious
than their parents are at risk for externalizing and internalizing symptoms:
the mediating role of parent–adolescent relationship quality. J Fam Psychol
2012; 26: 636–41.
31 Pratt D. Reactive co-radicalization: religious extremism as mutual discontent.
J Acad Stud Relig 2015; 28: 3–23.
32 Silke A. Holy Warriors: exploring the psychological processes of Jihadi
radicalization. Eur J Criminol 2008; 5: 99–123.
33 Ginges J, Hansen I, Norenzayan A. Religion and support for suicide attacks.
Psychol Sci 2009; 20: 224–30.
34 Siddique A. The Pashtun Question: The Unresolved Key to the Future of
Pakistan and Afghanistan. Hurst & Co., 2014.
35 Missinne S, Bracke P. Depressive symptoms among immigrants and ethnic
minorities: a population based study in 23 European countries. Soc
Psychiatry Psychiatr Epidemiol 2010; 47: 97–109.
36 U¨nlu¨ Ince B, Fassaert T, de Wit M, Cuijpers P, Smit J, Ruwaard J, et al. The
relationship between acculturation strategies and depressive and anxiety
disorders in Turkish migrants in the Netherlands. BMC Psychiatry 2014; 14:
252.
37 Lafferty K, Smith K, Madin E. The infectiousness of terrorist ideology: insights
from ecology and epidemiology. In Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach
to a Dangerous World (eds R Sagarin, T Taylor). University of California Press,
2008.
38 Johnson D, Madin J. Population models and counterinsurgency strategies.
In Natural Security: A Darwinian Approach to a Dangerous World (eds
R Sagarin, T Taylor). University of California Press, 2008.
39 Deffuant G, Amblard F, Weisbuch G, Faure T. How can extremism prevail? A
study based on the relative agreement interaction model. J Artif Soc Simul
2002; 5: 1 (http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/5/4/1.html).
40 Swann Jr WB, Buhrmester MD, Go´mez A, Jetten J, Bastian B, Va´zquez A, et al.
What makes a group worth dying for? Identity fusion fosters perception of
familial ties, promoting self-sacrifice. J Pers Soc Psychol 2014; 106: 912.
7
Data supplement to: Coid et al. Extremism, religion and psychiatric morbidity in a population-based sample of 
young men. Br J Psychiatry, doi: 10.1192/bjp.bp.116.186510 
Table DS1 Trends towards extremes by demographic factors, ethnicity and regionsa 
 Pro-British Anti-British 
 AOR 95% CI P AOR 95% CI P 
Demography       
Age (years) 1.01 1.00–1.03 0.094 1.02 1.00–1.03 0.088 
Low social class 0.88 0.74–1.05 0.158 1.17 0.93–1.46 0.180 
Higher educational 
qualifications 
0.76 0.60–0.95 0.016 1.25 0.99–1.59 0.060 
IMD percentile 0.99 0.91–1.08 0.768 1.11 1.00–1.22 0.048 
Ethnicity       
White (UK) Ref.      
White (Other) 0.30 0.16–0.57 <0.001 1.99 1.26–3.13 0.003 
Indian 0.28 0.17–0.46 <0.001 2.40 1.52–3.79 <0.001 
Pakistani 0.42 0.28–0.63 <0.001 2.80 1.81–4.35 <0.001 
Bangladeshi 0.32 0.17–0.63 0.001 1.60 0.68–3.77 0.282 
Other Asian 0.26 0.13–0.52 <0.001 1.79 1.00–3.21 0.051 
Black Caribbean 0.59 0.29–1.19 0.138 0.91 0.49–1.68 0.761 
Black African 0.28 0.17–0.47 <0.001 1.78 1.10–2.88 0.019 
Other Black 0.71 0.49–1.05 0.083 1.24 0.71–2.17 0.443 
Chinese/ other 0.33 0.18–0.60 <0.001 2.40 1.30–4.42 0.005 
Non-UK Born 0.49 0.35–0.67 <0.001 2.64 2.00–3.48 <0.001 
Religion       
Atheist/no religion Ref.      
Protestant 1.21 0.96–1.53 0.098 0.86 0.64–1.14 0.294 
Catholic 0.91 0.67–1.26 0.580 1.03 0.69–1.54 0.884 
Other Christian 0.66 0.42–1.06 0.088 1.60 1.04–2.47 0.031 
Muslim 0.67 0.48–0.92 0.014 2.28 1.62–3.21 <0.001 
Hindu 0.39 0.22–0.67 0.001 1.03 0.60–1.75 0.924 
Jewish/Sikh/Buddhist/other 0.60 0.39–0.91 0.016 1.62 1.02–2.57 0.040 
Attendance at services  0.85 0.76–0.94 0.002 1.50 1.28–1.76 <0.001 
Frequency of praying 0.91 0.83–0.99 0.035 1.37 1.18–1.59 <0.001 
a. See Table 1 in text for psychopathology, violence and crime. Logistic regression adjusted for survey 
type, age and index of multiple deprivation. 95% confidence intervals were estimated using robust 
standard errors to account for correlations within survey areas due to clustering within postcodes. 
Table DS2 Ethnicity, religion/religiosity and psychiatric morbidity 
 Psychosis Anxiety disorder Depression Alcohol dependence Drug misuse antisocial personality 
disorder 
 AOR 95% CI P AOR 95% CI P AOR 95% CI P AOR 95% CI P AOR 95% CI P AOR 95% CI P 
White UK born Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
White (other) 1.65 0.48–5.68 0.426 0.77 0.37–1.60 0.491 1.28 0.58–2.83 0.540 0.63 0.27–1.51 0.302 1.43 0.82–2.49 0.209 0.67 0.34–1.31 0.243 
Indian 1.56 0.43–5.68 0.496 1.10 0.60–1.98 0.764 1.47 0.67–3.21 0.332 0.75 0.30–1.85 0.526 0.49 0.24–0.97 0.042 0.25 0.10–0.61 0.002 
Pakistani 0.54 0.12–2.53 0.437 1.38 0.78–2.42 0.266 2.26 1.23–4.16 0.009 0.26 0.08–0.83 0.023 0.28 0.13–0.61 0.001 0.19 0.09–0.42 <0.001 
Bangladeshi ---#) ---#) ---#) 0.82 0.29–2.32 0.708 0.49 0.07–3.55 0.479 ---#) ---#) ---#) 0.25 0.09–0.66 0.005 0.04 0.01–0.31 0.002 
Other Asian  0.38 0.04–3.85 0.415 1.77 0.83–3.79 0.142 2.11 0.69–6.45 0.190 0.62 0.19–2.02 0.430 0.77 0.28–2.13 0.612 0.37 0.12–1.11 0.076 
Black Caribbean 1.09 0.14–8.60 0.938 0.44 0.16–1.19 0.107 2.61 1.23–5.54 0.013 1.18 0.46–3.05 0.730 0.77 0.35–1.70 0.525 0.91 0.44–1.92 0.811 
Black African 1.56 0.42–5.83 0.508 0.69 0.34–1.41 0.306 2.59 1.29–5.17 0.007 0.66 0.30–1.47 0.312 0.58 0.29–1.15 0.121 0.85 0.43–1.66 0.624 
Other Black 2.13 0.80–5.68 0.131 1.19 0.63–2.25 0.583 3.60 1.77–7.36 <0.001 1.33 0.70–2.50 0.382 0.89 0.51–1.57 0.690 0.68 0.37–1.23 0.199 
Chinese/other 3.17 0.83–12.11 0.091 1.15 0.51–2.60 0.737 1.96 0.68–5.66 0.215 0.60 0.23–1.52 0.278 0.39 0.15–0.98 0.044 0.33 0.13–0.85 0.021 
Atheist/no religion Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
Protestant 0.51 0.23–1.17 0.111 0.68 0.49–0.95 0.025 0.96 0.64–1.46 0.865 0.54 0.35–0.83 0.005 0.47 0.34–0.65 <0.001 0.54 0.38–0.78 0.001 
Catholic 1.25 0.53–2.99 0.609 0.82 0.51–1.31 0.406 1.10 0.62–1.94 0.743 0.38 0.20–0.74 0.004 0.43 0.27–0.69 <0.001 0.68 0.44–1.06 0.088 
Other Christian 1.44 0.54–3.80 0.463 0.86 0.45–1.63 0.638 0.75 0.36–1.60 0.463 0.37 0.18–0.75 0.006 0.41 0.23–0.73 0.002 0.59 0.33–1.02 0.060 
Muslim 0.55 0.15–2.03 0.368 0.95 0.61–1.49 0.833 1.29 0.71–2.34 0.397 0.12 0.05–0.30 <0.001 0.21 0.11–0.38 <0.001 0.26 0.15–0.46 <0.001 
Hindu 0.88 0.19–4.11 0.868 0.96 0.51–1.81 0.899 0.71 0.21–2.37 0.578 0.36 0.13–1.00 0.050 0.21 0.08–0.54 0.001 0.36 0.14–0.90 0.029 
Jewish/Sikh/Buddhist/other 1.14 0.34–3.88 0.831 1.13 0.65–1.98 0.660 0.87 0.39–1.96 0.742 0.37 0.16–0.84 0.017 1.33 0.82–2.15 0.249 0.87 0.48–1.58 0.643 
Attendance at services 1.17 1.00–1.37 0.053 0.99 0.92– 1.08 0.897 1.01 0.90–1.13 0.875 0.71 0.61–0.84 <0.001 0.74 0.66–0.84 <0.001 0.78 0.69–0.88 <0.001 
Frequency of praying 1.13 0.98–1.29 0.087 0.97 0.89–1.07 0.557 0.98 0.88–1.10 0.737 0.72 0.61–0.85 <0.001 0.77 0.70–0.86 <0.001 0.82 0.75–0.90 <0.001 
 Note. Logistic regression adjusted for survey type, age and index of multiple deprivation. 95% confidence intervals were estimated using robust 
standard errors to account for correlations within survey areas due to clustering within postcodes. #) No estimate possible due to sparse data.  
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